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THE CONGLOMERATE: AN AGGLOMERATION
OF VIEWS REVIEWED
IRWIN M. STELZER*

The impressive array of papers which makes up this volume touches
almost every aspect of the problem raised for antitrust policymakers and
implementers by the conglomerate form of business organization. Since I
have been cited in one of these papers (Kuhlman and Duke) as one who
sees the conglomerate as "a new and dangerous threat .

.

. " and on the

basis of an earlier article1 in this journal have been termed a defender of
these same conglomerates, I feel ideally situated to attempt to place these
valuable, separate contributions in some broader perspective. Who, after
all, is better qualified as a synthesizer than one who has himself straddled
the issues?
The range of the papers here included is impressive. They reflect the
fact that many economists are seriously concerned about any further weakening of the vigor of competition in our economy, vaguely feel that conglomeration poses some such threat, but find, in Richard Miller's words,
that "the analytical links between a conglomerate merger and an increase
in monopoly power are generally unconvincing .. " Professor Kamerschen,
in fact, finds that the recent wave of conglomerate mergers "has had little
direct impact on market concentration." It is, of course, correct that conglomerate mergers, by definition, do not create a problem of added concentration in some "relevant market." Indeed, the Justice Department has
relied on no such argument; rather, it has based its policy position on the
fear of "superconcentration." This argument rests on the view that our antitrust laws are rooted in a social philosophy which abhors excessive concentration of economic power. Mr. McLaren, for example, has noted that the
antitrust laws seek to preserve competition because "it protects our political
system by promoting a broad dispersion of economic power among the
many, rather than concentration in the hands of a few." 2 With this interpretation of the social objectives of the antitrust laws it is difficult to quarrel. And there is little question that, when the Congress amended the Clayton Act 3 in 1950, it had similar objectives, fearing what Representative
Celler called "the level of concentration in American industry";4 and what
Representative Boggs called "one of the most detrimental movements to a
free enterprise economy-. . . the conglomerate acquisition." 5 Indeed, the
House Report accompanying the bill sought "to make it clear that the bill
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applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as
7
well as horizontal .... 6 But, it adds, "which have the specified effects of
to create a monopoly. "
substantially lessening competition . . .or tending
So, we come full circle. Conglomerate mergers are to be prevented when
they lessen competition. But do they?
The views expressed in these papers cover a wide range. Stanley Hollander finds conglomerates to have a beneficial effect on competition and
consumer welfare in the retail trades; William Smith favors a "sympathetic"
attitude toward financial congenerics; and John Kuhlman and Richard
Duke find it "impossible ...to assert that conglomerate acquisitions reduce competition within the traditional interpretation of that phrase."
Werner Sichel more or less concurs: "Conglomerateness per se does not impede competition," and is joined by Richard Miller, "Analysis ...indicates
that conglomerate mergers and corporate diversity may improve competition
or be neutral, contrary to the analysis contained in current merger policy."
On the other hand, Joel Dirlam has a less sanguine view concerning
the structural impact of conglomerates. "As the diversity and size of the
conglomerates grow, the possibility that further mergers will eliminate potential competition is easier and easier to envisage." In this view he is joined
by Charles Berry, who sees conglomerate mergers as "a way, if not of creating market power, certainly of augmenting such power."
As I read these papers, certain generalizations suggest themselves.
First, as indicated above, the dominant view concerning the relation of
conglomerates to market structure is that they do not increase concentration,
but do increase business size. Those who focus on the former aspect of market structure tend to be relatively undisturbed by the now-ebbing conglomerate merger wave; those who fear business "site" (Dirlam) or "power"
(Corwin Edwards), or "corporate scale" (Berry) are more troubled by the
conglomerate phenomenon. My own view is that while conglomerates do
indeed increase the size and scope of business units, they provide the important offsetting advantage of enabling newcomers to rise to positions of economic power, introduce new ways of financing and managing businesses,
and unseat entrenched managements. This, rather than some concept of
optimum corporate size, may be just the fluidity the antitrust laws seek to
preserve. Mr. Mitchell has admonished that conglomerate mergers may "indeed be a threat to our ... social structure." 8 But they may be a "threat"
in a very different sense from that understood by the Attorney General's
auditors. When the respected London Economist reported on the move
against the LTV-Jones &cLaughlin merger, it noted:
Outside Washington a discreet cheer for the suit against Ling was
raised in the boardrooms of the big steel companies; the steel trade
unions liked it too. A raider like Ling-Temco-Vought is an instant and
6
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unwelcome competitor to the established giants, and with its higher
earnings multiples can even threaten to buy them out. As for the unions,
they find it harder to bring a multi-product company like Ling to its
knees in a dispute than a mammoth but almost single-product company.9

And Senator Philip A. Hart, Chairman of the Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, wondered about the sudden spurt in interest in
attacking new, but not "established," diversified firms in an attempt "to
maintain the status quo."' 0 There are, after all, "close to a dozen apparently
traditional U.S. corporations . . . which possess a breadth of unrelated

diversification at least as great as that of the so-called conglomerates."' 1 Indeed, as L. E. Birdzell notes in his paper, diversification is a traditional and
accepted practice in American industry, although he suggests that, to some
extent, "the older multi-product firms in fact diversify more from necessity
than from choice ...
The direction in which policy is pushed by a desire to preserve competition is, then, not clear. Conglomerate mergers would appear to provide,
in many instances, the only realistic possibility of entry by a newcomer management with, perhaps, a different view of such things as the efficacy of
price competition - into concentrated industries. They often provide, in
their take-over bids and threats, an opportunity for stockholders to unseat
otherwise all-but-impregnable, self-perpetuating managements. Fortune
notes, "The recent merger wave, especially the take-over bid, has powerfully
2
revived the influence of stockholders."'
That the entry of a newcomer via merger, rather than through the
construction of new productive capacity, can be unsettling there is little
doubt. Take the case of Wheeling Steel during the period of Norton Simon's reign. In contrast to the other steel producers, Wheeling adopted a
policy of protecting its customers against price increases instituted after
their orders were taken. This, in the words of the trade press "broke the
solid steel front of 'price in effect at time of shipment.' "18 Whether or not
Wheeling could handle the resultant flood of business is irrelevant for our
purposes; the fact remains that a new manager of existing assets tried a new
method of pricing, to the consternation of the steel establishment. Would
the cause of competition have been served by keeping the Hunt Foods conglomerate out of the steel business? Jules Backman is undoubtedly correct
when he points out, in his article, "By 'shaking things up' the conglomerate
can add a new dimension to competition in many markets."
When we turn from structure to problems of business practice, the difficulties increase. The most widely discussed problem is that of reciprocity.
9 Biting the Hand of Business, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 5, 1969, at 35.
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And here, two questions are raised: (1) Is reciprocity "bad"? (2) Does conglomeration enhance the possibility of its occurrence?
Mr. Birdzell feels that reciprocity is neither "unambiguously evil" in
effect or so likely of occurrence "that otherwise reasonable forms of business
organization must be suppressed in order to avoid reciprocity." Backman,
in an extensive discussion of reciprocity, attempts to distinguish "the opportunity for reciprocity" from "the actual practice of reciprocity." Indeed, he
goes further, and argues that where price and other factors are identical,
"it is illogical to hold that a company is guilty of an anticompetitive act
when purchases are made from its friends," i.e., "a supplier who also is a
good customer." Why, then, do so many place such emphasis on the reciprocity problem? I suspect it stems from two basic sources. First, as Dirlam
points out, "Expansion through conglomerate merger increases the number
of markets in which there may be a danger of reciprocity." Second, the
public sense of equity is offended by the notion that a corporate interrelationship, rather than efficiency, determines who becomes a major corporation's supplier.
In my own view, diversification (not only conglomeration) does enhance
the possibility of reciprocity. A business firm engaged in many areas of activity can demand from suppliers of one division reciprocal business for another. Indeed, in some instances it need make no explicit demand; the
matter can be left to its suppliers' imaginations, and what Judge Timbers
has called the "reciprocity effect" may occur. 14 And there is little doubt that
reciprocity is a widespread practice, although one which is probably declining (at least on a formalized basis).' 5 But the potential for reciprocity which
conglomeration produces is as likely to be the result of diversification by
internal expansion as it is of conglomeration by mergers. Consequently, if
we were to forge a public policy aimed at preventing the creation of any
potential for reciprocal business dealing, we would have to develop some
program aimed at preventing diversification via internal growth as well as
via merger. And this none of the authors represented here states a clear willingness to do. Perhaps we shall have to learn to live with the potential threat
while sharpening our attack on the actual practice of reciprocity. This can
be done by careful analysis of the extent to which a company's purchasing
policy is guided by a desire to reward customers. In this connection it has
been my own experience that the more usual quantitative methods are of
little value. The simple statement, "I'll buy from you if you buy from me,"
would imply the usefulness of measures of interrelationship (correlation) to
detect reciprocity. But we have found that such techniques yield spurious
results in some instances. Another technique and its associated statistical
tests may, however, be used to detect and measure reciprocal practices.
14 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 781 (D. Conn.
1969).
15 Mr. McLaren has noted that as a result of the Department's enforcement efforts,
"[flirms that engaged in systematic reciprocity more or less in self-defense have tended
to abandon it ...." Address by Richard W. McLaren, in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. A-5 (Feb. 3, 1970).
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This technique employs the use of purchase and sales data of potential
reciprocity and nonreciprocity candidates. Detailed comparisons of sales and
purchage increases and decreases can be developed. These then can be compared with the kinds of increases and decreases which one would expect in
the presence or absence of reciprocity. These relationships can be analyzed
statistically and tested through probability analysis. The final output from
this analysis is then twofold: the qualitative acceptance or rejection of the
hypothesis that "reciprocity has existed," and a quantitative determination
of its extent, if any.
These should provide supplements to the studies of the factors suggested as relevant by Judge Timbers: whether the product characteristics
lend themselves to reciprocal dealing (Backman notes that some products
"are not susceptible to reciprocity"); the size and diversification of other
competitors; and so on.
By thus focusing on the practice, as the Justice Department did in the
case of U.S. Steel, it can eliminate the dichotomous policy of moving against
conglomerate mergers which create only the potential for reciprocity, while
supporting a bill which would be likely to permit banks to enter the insurance, travel agency and other businesses- this in a period of tight money
and where many states have interest rate ceilings. For banks are, as Fitzgerald said of the very rich, different from the rest of us. Not only do they, as
Hemingway reportedly pointed out in response, have more money, but their
substantial power over credit creates such a probability that their customers
will feel obliged to use their other divisions, that bank diversification should
be separately and more closely restricted. (But note carefully William
Smith's contrary argument that the analysis on which this conclusion rests
"failed to acknowledge the essential dynamics of market structure where
resale price maintenance with free entry prevails.")
The other widely treated problem is that of subsidization, with Dirlam
perhaps raising the issue most squarely. There can be little question that
conglomeration creates a danger of subsidization. Conglomerates can, if they
so choose, finance operating losses of one subsidiary or division with profits
from another - and for protracted periods. This results in resource misallocation as well as in possible competitive injury to the efficient, nondiversified competitor. The latter finds himself faced with the competition
of a division immune from the market test of its efficiency, and from the
penalty for inefficiency.
Again, however, we are faced with a problem which is implicit in all
conglomeration, not only conglomeration via merger. The question, which
it seems to me can only be answered on a case-by-case basis, is whether this
potential for subsidization actually materializes and what policies can be
developed to minimize the extent of subsidization.
That there is a substantial amount of short-run subsidization in any
diversified enterprise I do not doubt. Whether there is long-term subsidization of uneconomic ventures I do not know- this is one of several areas
in which our lack of knowledge of the behavior of diversified enterprises is
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the corner. Perhaps for these reasons, there seems to be a growing pressure
on big firms to spin off their losing and marginal operations. The trade
journal of the merger movement, Mergers and Acquisitions, looks to the
sale of divisional subsidiaries or branch operations as a source of "much
6
activity in the coming decade."' M & A notes, "There is far more status
to lose in the management community by keeping a loser going than in
17
trying, failing and getting out quickly."' As a consequence, over 20 percent
of the consummated mergers now represent the sell-off of a division, subsidiary or product line - and these sell-offs are occurring at twice the average of earlier years,' 8 Examples abound: Walter Kidde & Company is reportedly considering selling divisions which might, as independent companies,
command higher market multiples; Computing c Software, Inc. sold its
Gencom Agency to E.M.I. Electronics Ltd. (Gencom distributed E.M.I.'s
electro-optical products) to permit "further management concentration on the
19
Bendix sold its semiconductor
company's primary business endeavors";
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on.
so
and
Inc.,
Devices,
to
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business
represent something other than disposal of a loser: an acquirer may possess
some scarce resource which will accelerate the growth rate of another company's division, and hence be in a position to offer an irresistibly attractive
price.)
To the extent, then, that we now have sell-offs of divisions, and that
this will be accelerated by the advent of divisional profit reporting, the
danger of subsidization is reduced. And, of course, any systematic subsidization aimed at driving out a competitor always has been subject to antitrust
action. Consequently, in view of the fact that subsidization is a potential
danger inherent in all diversification, not only conglomeration via merger,
and in light of the considerations discussed above concerning the need to
maintain fluidity, the potential for subsidization does not seem to provide
a clear and sufficient basis for an overall anti-conglomerate twist to antitrust
merger policy.
But these tentative conclusions are my own. The wide range of information and the sharp insights provided by the authors represented in this
volume certainly permit quite contrary judgments to be reached. In either
case, however, the judgments will be more informed, and the level of the
debate elevated, by the existence of this volume.
16
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